Defining Forced Labor: The Legal Battle to
Protect Detained Immigrants from Private
Exploitation
Samantha Sherman †
0F

Privately run immigration detention facilities allegedly profit from a nationwide system of forced labor. People detained in these for-profit facilities allege that
they are compelled to work—often without pay—under threats of solitary confinement, deprivation of basic necessities, and other serious harms. Advocates have challenged these human rights abuses through a series of class action lawsuits under
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The TVPA’s forced labor provision,
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1589, prohibits the use of “labor or services” obtained by force
or coercion. If successful, these lawsuits would not only help vindicate the rights of
the hundreds of thousands of people detained in these prisonlike facilities each year
but would also call into question the viability of the entire private immigration detention industry.
This Comment examines one critical legal question raised by the pending litigation: How should courts define what activities are “labor or services” under
§ 1589? Private detention corporations argue that the activities that plaintiffs allege
they were forced to perform, such as cleaning bathrooms and common areas, are
merely housekeeping tasks that do not qualify as “labor or services” under the TVPA.
This Comment argues that this defense is inconsistent with the TVPA’s text, its
legislative history, and existing case law. Drawing from the Second Circuit’s decision in McGarry v. Pallito, this Comment proposes a new standard for courts to
apply in determining whether a certain task qualifies as “labor or services” in the
detention context. First, courts should consider whether the task is truly personal.
Second, courts should assess whether the purpose of the task is to defray institutional costs. This standard will help ensure that people held in for-profit immigration detention centers receive the full federal protection from forced labor to which
they are entitled.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past seven years, a bitterly fought legal battle over
one key question has slowly advanced through the courts: Can
private immigration detention corporations require detained
people to work under threat of solitary confinement, deprivation
of basic essentials, and other serious harms? Despite the United
States’ constitutional and statutory prohibitions on forced labor,
people detained in privately operated immigration detention centers allege that these corporations profit from an illegal system of
forced labor. Recent litigation seeks to end these practices by
bringing class action suits against detention corporations under
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). 1 This far-reaching
Act prohibits conduct related to human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and forced labor.
1F

1
Pub. L. No. 106–386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
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CoreCivic and GEO Group, the two largest private-prison corporations in the United States, 2 currently face five federal class
action lawsuits for allegedly violating the TVPA’s forced labor
provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1589. This provision creates civil
and criminal liability for “[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person” by “threat” or use of “force,”
“physical restraint,” “serious harm,” “abuse of law or legal process,” or “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or
services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm
or physical restraint.” 3
Thus far, courts have certified classes comprised of thousands
of currently and formerly detained people in three of the five ongoing cases. The outcome of this litigation, however, is far from
certain. At stake are the human rights of hundreds of thousands
of people who are detained each year in for-profit detention facilities. People detained in these facilities have reported harrowing
stories of abusive forced labor practices that not only violate fundamental principles of human dignity but also pose serious dangers to their mental and physical health and well-being.
Recent events have magnified the stakes of these suits. In the
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, reports emerged of private detention facilities forcing detained people to work without proper
protection from the highly contagious virus. 4 People confined in a
COVID-infected facility operated by CoreCivic released a letter
reporting that CoreCivic used “verbal threats” and “indefinite
lock ins” to force them to work in the kitchen and other areas
without proper protective gear despite the high COVID-19 risk. 5
2F

3F

4F

5F

2
ALEXANDRA LEVY, HUM. TRAFFICKING LEGAL CTR., FACT SHEET: HUMAN
TRAFFICKING & FORCED LABOR IN FOR-PROFIT DETENTION FACILITIES 6 (2018).
3
18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)–(c). The pending federal suits include: Owino v. CoreCivic,
Inc., No. 17-CV-01112 (S.D. Cal. filed May 31, 2017); Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18CV-00070 (M.D. Ga. filed Apr. 17, 2018); Novoa v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-CV-02514 (C.D.
Cal. filed Dec. 19, 2017); Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 14-CV-02887 (D. Colo. filed Oct.
22, 2014); Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc. (M. Gonzalez), No. 18-CV-00169 (W.D. Tex. filed Feb.
22, 2018). Another suit, Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc. (C. Gonzalez), No. 17-CV-02573 (S.D.
Cal. filed Dec. 27, 2017), was filed but stayed pending the resolution of Owino because the
putative class was duplicative of the class defined in Owino. See C. Gonzalez 2018 WL
1621543, at *6.
4
See Jacob Soboroff & Julia Ainsley, Detained Migrants Say They Were Forced to
Clean
COVID-Infected
ICE
Facility,
NBC
NEWS
(June
10,
2020),
https://perma.cc/A6QM-TF6G.
5
Letter from Detainees, La Palma Corr. Ctr., to the Florence Immigrants & Refugees Rts. Project (May 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/JG7Y-S47G.
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“Were [sic] begging you for help because this is a life or death situation,” the letter concludes. 6 Yet for-profit detention corporations claim not only that “claims of ‘forced’ work are false” 7 but
also that these claims should not give rise to criminal or civil liability regardless of their veracity.
This Comment examines one legal question raised by the
pending litigation: the scope of § 1589’s “labor or services” language. Because § 1589 does not define “labor or services,” interpreting this language has become a recurring flashpoint in TVPA
cases since its enactment in 2000. Prosecutors and plaintiffs argue that courts should interpret “labor or services” broadly because Congress intended the statute to provide robust protection
to victims regardless of the class of labor or service they were
forced to perform. In contrast, defendants argue for narrow interpretations of “labor or services,” especially interpretations that
exclude domestic labor and housekeeping tasks, such as cleaning. Private detention corporations facing TVPA suits similarly
argue that detained plaintiffs’ allegations amount to little more
than “general housekeeping responsibilities.” 8 They argue that
Congress could not have intended the TVPA, enacted with “the
sole purpose . . . to target, deter, and prosecute international human trafficking, and protect trafficking victims,” to apply to such
conduct. 9
Analyzing the history and purpose of § 1589 and two decades
of TVPA case law, this Comment argues that cleaning and otherwise maintaining private detention facilities qualify as “labor or
services” under § 1589. First, although combatting transnational
human trafficking was one of the purposes of the TVPA, Congress
also intended the TVPA’s broad provisions to address domestic
concerns. Second, courts have consistently held that “labor or
services” can encompass housekeeping tasks. This analysis
demonstrates that the tasks plaintiffs allege that they were
forced to perform while detained should not be categorically excluded from the scope of “labor or services.”
6F

7F

8F

9F

6

Id.
See, e.g., Soboroff & Ainsley, supra note 4 (quoting a statement from a CoreCivic
spokesperson).
8
Replacement Opening Brief for Appellant at 27–28, Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc.,
951 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-15081), 2019 WL 1417078, at *27–28 [hereinafter
CoreCivic Barrientos Brief] (quoting Bijeol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423, 424–25 (7th Cir. 1978)).
9
Id. at 21.
7
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Private detention corporations contest this conclusion as absurd and as endangering their ability to enforce basic rules necessary for safety and order in a communal facility. Courts have
demonstrated some receptiveness to defendants’ arguments that
basic housekeeping chores should, at a minimum, be excluded
from the definition of “labor or services.” This Comment argues
that a wholesale exception for the vague category of housekeeping
activities is misguided. Instead, courts should consider two factors when drawing a line in the detention context between basic
tasks necessary for order and tasks that constitute actionable
forced labor under the TVPA. First, courts should consider
whether the task is truly personal. Second, courts should assess
whether the purpose of the task is to defray institutional costs.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of immigration
detention and discusses the various forms of voluntary and allegedly involuntary labor within detention facilities. Part II examines the central constitutional and statutory prohibitions on
forced labor in the United States. Part III summarizes some important features of the ongoing § 1589 suits. Part IV analyzes the
purpose, legislative history, and case law of the TVPA in order to
understand the meaning of “labor or services” in § 1589. Part V
applies this analysis to the current § 1589 lawsuits and proposes
a new test to determine whether the activities plaintiffs allege
give rise to a § 1589 claim.
I. IMMIGRATION DETENTION, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, AND
LABOR
A.

Immigration Detention

Courts have long held that immigration detention is civil—
not criminal—detention. The federal immigration detention system was established in 1891, and the first Supreme Court decisions
distinguishing immigration detention from criminal incarceration
followed shortly thereafter. 10 People are not sent to immigration
detention facilities as punishment for a crime. Rather, immigration
detention serves the “preventive” purpose of ensuring that people
appear at hearings or comply with removal orders. 11 Similarly, the
10F

1F

10 See Anita Sinha, Slavery by Another Name: “Voluntary” Immigrant Detainee Labor
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 8–10 (2015).
11 See id. at 10–11; see also U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, PERFORMANCE-BASED
NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS 2011, at i (2016) [hereinafter PBNDS] (“ICE detains
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Court has resisted characterizing deportation and removal as
criminal punishments and emphasized the civil enforcement nature of these processes. 12 Because of this distinction, the Supreme
Court has denied to people who are detained for suspected civil
immigration violations many of the constitutional rights that
they would be guaranteed if facing incarceration through the
criminal justice system.
Most people whom Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) detains in immigration facilities are awaiting immigration
court hearings and decisions on whether they may legally remain
in the country. They include asylum seekers, torture and human
trafficking survivors, people who have overstayed legally granted
visas, people who have lived in the United States for decades, legal permanent residents, U.S. military veterans, and even U.S.
citizens. 13 While immigration detention was once reserved only
for rare cases in which a person suspected of an immigration violation was determined to be a particular risk, that is far from the
case today. ICE’s own data suggest that the overwhelming majority of people it currently detains pose no danger to the public. 14
Regardless of its formal legal classification as a civil system,
immigration detention is a significant deprivation of liberty and
shares many similarities with incarceration in terms of everyday
life inside detention centers. In fact, many facilities that house
people awaiting immigration hearings or removal proceedings
were originally designed as prisons. 15 Living conditions commonly
12F

13F

14F

15F

people for no purpose other than to secure their presence both for immigration proceedings
and their removal.”).
12 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of
deportation is not a punishment for crime. . . . It is but a method of enforcing the return
[of an immigrant] to his own country.”).
13 See
Immigration
Detention
101,
DET. WATCH NETWORK (2019),
https://perma.cc/VD4C-Q37X; Maria Ines Zamudio, Deported U.S. Veterans Feel Abandoned by the Country They Defended, NPR (June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/88XH-5VRP;
DAVID J. BIER, CATO INST., U.S. CITIZENS TARGETED BY ICE 3 (2018).
14 See Tara Tidwell Cullen, ICE Released Its Most Comprehensive Immigration Detention Data Yet. It’s Alarming, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://perma.cc/NC2V-58UQ; see also Decline in ICE Detainees with Criminal Records
Could Shape Agency’s Response to COVID-19 Pandemic, TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://perma.cc/3TB6-GBPY (reporting that only approximately 10.7% of people in ICE
detention have a serious criminal conviction). This Comment’s discussion of the differences between civil detention and criminal incarceration should not be read to imply an
acceptance of forced labor in the criminal incarceration context.
15 See CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. CLINIC, PENN STATE L., IMPRISONED JUSTICE:
INSIDE TWO GEORGIA IMMIGRANT DETENTION CENTERS 31 (2017) [hereinafter IMPRISONED
JUSTICE]; see also Jacqueline Stevens, One Dollar per Day: The Slaving Wages of Immigration Jail, from 1943 to Present, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 410, 413 (2015) (discussing
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associated with prisons, such as bathrooms shared among large
numbers of people without privacy, are the norm. 16 Detention facilities also regularly employ prisonlike disciplinary practices,
such as “segregation,” which can involve isolating and locking
people in cells for up to twenty-three hours per day. 17
ICE operates only a fraction of all immigration detention facilities. Instead, the vast majority of people detained for suspected
immigration violations are sent to facilities operated by private
companies. These for-profit companies secure lucrative contracts
with ICE or with state and local governments and are compensated for each person booked into the facility. 18 In total, over 80%
of people in the immigration detention system are detained in privately operated facilities. 19
By numerous accounts, conditions in for-profit immigration
detention facilities are deplorable. Advocacy groups, congressional
representatives, journalists, and scholars have documented the
inhumane conditions of these facilities, including dangerously
subpar medical practices, rampant sexual abuse, and lack of access to legal assistance. 20 Internal inspections of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), which oversees ICE, corroborate
these reports. For example, DHS’s 2018 inspection of one GEOoperated facility uncovered “significant health and safety risks,
including nooses in detainee cells, improper and overly restrictive
segregation, and inadequate detainee medical care.” 21 Some facilities do not adequately provide basic necessities. Water, for example, “has been described as green, non-potable, smelling of feces,
or completely shut off,” and food as “spoiled or expired. . . . undercooked, burnt, or rancid.” 22
16F

17F

18F

19F

20F

21F

2F

Performance-Based National Detention Standards in “non-dedicated” facilities, which are
“typically county jails with a wing rented out to ICE”).
16 IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 30.
17 Id. at 36–39.
18 See Sharita Gruberg, How For-Profit Companies Are Driving Immigration Detention Policies, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/T743-FA4C.
19 ACLU, JUSTICE-FREE ZONES: U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION UNDER THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION 17 (2020).
20 See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. & DET. WATCH NETWORK, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY TOOLKIT: A GUIDE FOR MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS VISITING ICE JAILS 6–7 (2019).
21 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, CONCERNS
ABOUT DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES 3 (2019).
22 IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 31–32.
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Despite the flood of reports documenting the inhumane conditions of many privately operated facilities, immigration detention remains a booming business. ICE paid out over $1.2 billion
in detention contracts to GEO and CoreCivic in 2019 alone. 23 Both
companies rely on immigration detention for a significant portion
of their profits. 24 Under the Trump administration, the immigration detention system grew at an unprecedented rate, with detention rates skyrocketing and billions of dollars in contracts
awarded to private detention companies. 25
23F

24F

25F

B.

Labor Programs in Detention Centers

To fully understand plaintiffs’ forced labor claims, it is important to first discuss the structure of formal work programs in
detention centers. ICE requires all detention centers to operate a
Voluntary Work Program (VWP), which allows people “to work
and earn money while confined.” 26 Through this program, people
can volunteer for various job assignments, such as food service,
laundry, barber service, medical detail, and paint detail. 27 In exchange, detention facilities are only required to provide workers
a minimum wage of $1 per eight-hour workday. 28 Workers can use
this stipend to purchase food, personal hygiene products, payphone
credit, and other items at the detention center’s commissary.
Surprisingly, there is virtually no legislation concerning the
VWP. A one-sentence statute from 1950 serves as the legal basis
for the operation of work programs in immigration detention facilities. This statute authorizes the appropriation of funds to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (ICE’s predecessor) for
“payment of allowances (at such rate as may be specified from
time to time in the appropriation Act involved) to aliens, while
held in custody under the immigration laws, for work performed.” 29 The compensation rate contemplated when Congress
26F

27F

28F

29F

23

See ACLU, supra note 19, at 17.
Id.
25 See id. at 14–15.
26 PBNDS, supra note 11, at 405.
27 See, e.g., Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-02514, 2019 WL 7195331, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 26, 2019).
28 The dollar-per-day rate is a legal minimum. Statistics on the actual stipend that
private detention facilities pay to VWP workers are difficult to find due to a lack of transparency. Stipend rates also vary among job assignments and facilities. Professor Jacqueline
Stevens, through extensive research and Freedom of Information Act litigation, has concluded that detention centers pay VWP workers $1–$3 per day. See Stevens, supra note
15, at 415–17.
29 8 U.S.C. § 1555.
24
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passed this provision in 1950 was $1 per day. Adjusted for inflation, the dollar-per-day wage would equal approximately $10.63
in 2019. 30 But in the seventy years since the passage of this provision, Congress has never set a rate higher than $1 per day. 31 In
2017, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights called on Congress to
address these “abusive labor practices” and “require fair wages
for all detainees.” 32 Congress, however, has yet to act. Indeed, a
group of eighteen Republican representatives recently issued a
letter in support of the dollar-per-day rate. 33
Numerous lawsuits have targeted the VWP’s low pay rate,
questioning its legality in light of minimum wage laws and other
labor regulations such as the Fair Labor Standards Act. 34 While
these claims are outside the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that the legality of the VWP itself is controversial,
even when people participate willingly.
Aside from the one-sentence provision mentioning an allowance for work performed by people in immigration custody, now
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1555, no other federal legislation directly refers to work programs in immigration detention centers. Instead,
the rules governing the VWP are provided by ICE’s PerformanceBased National Detention Standards (PBNDS), a set of guidelines
30F

31F

32F

3F

34F

30 See
Inflation
Calculator,
FED.
RESERVE
BANK
MINNEAPOLIS,
https://perma.cc/LY4Z-K68Y.
31 See Stevens, supra note 15, at 461–65. In fact, the last time that Congress specified
the compensation rate was in the Appropriations Act of 1978, after which Congress ceased
to include an express compensation rate in its appropriation acts. Department of Justice
Appropriation Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-86, 91 Stat. 424, 426. Stevens argues that this
congressional neglect has potential consequences for the legality of the dollar-per-day payment in light of other labor and wage laws. See Stevens, supra note 15, at 439–48.
32 U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNED WITH
ALLEGED ABUSIVE LABOR PRACTICES AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS 1 (2017).
33 See Letter from Steve King, Representative, U.S. Cong., et al., to Jefferson B.
Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Alexander Acosta, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab. &
Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/T8RS-J97N.
34 See, e.g., Alvarado Guevara v. INS, 902 F.2d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(challenging dollar-per-day wages in a government detention facility as a violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act); Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1128 (D.
Colo. 2015) (challenging dollar-per-day wages in a GEO detention facility as a violation of
Colorado’s minimum wage laws); Washington v. GEO Grp., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 967 (W.D.
Wash. 2017) (challenging dollar-per-day wages in a GEO detention facility as a violation
of Washington’s minimum wage laws). For more analysis of these cases, see Jacqueline
Stevens, One Dollar per Day: A Note on Recent Forced Labor and Dollar-per-Day Wages in
Private Prisons Holding People Under Immigration Law, 52 VAL. U. L. REV. 343, 346–64,
366–67 (2018); Stevens, supra note 15, at 400–03; Seth H. Garfinkel, The Voluntary Work
Program: Expanding Labor Laws to Protect Detained Immigrant Workers, 67 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1287, 1310–17 (2017).
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for administering immigration detention centers. The PBNDS are
ICE-drafted guidelines that are not legally binding. 35 They have
no basis in statute nor were they promulgated in accordance with
administrative rulemaking processes. ICE is not legally obligated
to follow these guidelines in the operation of detention centers
and can alter the guidelines at any time. ICE does, however, incorporate the PBNDS into its contracts with private detention
corporations. This means that private detention corporations are
required to abide by the PBNDS by the terms of their government
contracts. 36
Section 5.8 of the PBNDS addresses the purpose and scope of
the VWP but provides only a skeletal outline of the program. 37
Most details are left to the discretion of detention center administrators. The PBNDS do specify, however, that “[d]etainees shall
be able to volunteer for work assignments but otherwise shall not
be required to work, except to do personal housekeeping.” 38 The
PBNDS define the “personal housekeeping” duties of detained
people as: “1. making their bunk beds daily; 2. stacking loose papers; 3. keeping the floor free of debris and dividers free of clutter;
and 4. refraining from hanging/draping clothing, pictures, keepsakes, or other objects from beds, overhead lighting fixtures or
other furniture.” 39
It is important to note that—despite the extremely low wages
and the alleged use of coercion to be explored more in depth in the
next Section—some detained people report a positive experience
with the VWP. 40 One man formerly detained by ICE, for example,
noted that working through the VWP “broke up the tedium of being locked up and the stress of dealing with his constantly delayed
appeals.” 41 This is consistent with the experience of many immigration attorneys, who have noted that, although detained clients
may have complaints about the VWP, many do not want to see it
35F

36F

37F

38F

39F

40F

41F

35 See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32369, IMMIGRATION-RELATED
DETENTION: CURRENT LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 11 (2012).
36 See Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *2.
37 See PBNDS, supra note 11, at 405–09.
38 Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
39 Id. at 406.
40 See Sinha, supra note 10, at 33 (“[M]any detainees . . . welcome the opportunity to
work as a way to endure the stress and boredom of incarceration.”).
41 Yana Kunichoff, “Voluntary” Work Program in Private Detention Centers Pays
Detained Immigrants $1 a Day, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Aug. 15, 2012),
https://perma.cc/J29A-JF93.
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disappear. 42 The subminimum wages and potential labor law violations endemic to the VWP, however, should not be ignored
simply because the program also provides some benefits.
Despite the potential benefits of a voluntary work program,
the current § 1589 suits hinge on allegations that much of the
work in detention centers is not voluntary. Eduardo Zuñiga’s account of his experience at a CoreCivic detention center in Georgia
is illustrative. 43 While working in the facility’s kitchen, Zuñiga
suffered painful on-the-job injuries that resulted in a shattered,
infected toenail and a torn ligament in his knee. Medical staff
eventually ordered Zuñiga to rest his injured leg. 44 Nevertheless,
Zuñiga reported that CoreCivic guards “threatened him with ‘the
hole’ [i.e., solitary confinement]” if he did not report for his work
shift. 45 CoreCivic denied any evidence of the incident, 46 but stories
like Zuñiga’s are common. The next Section discusses the allegations of forced labor in for-profit detention centers that underpin
the current § 1589 suits against CoreCivic and GEO.
42F

43F

4F

45F

C.

46F

Forced Labor Allegations

Plaintiffs allege that private detention corporations systematically force detained people to work both within and outside of
the VWP. The conduct underlying these claims can be sorted into
four main categories: (1) mandatory unpaid cleaning assignments, (2) forced participation in the VWP, (3) coerced participation in the VWP through deprivation of basic essentials, and
(4) coerced unpaid labor through a shadow unpaid work program.
This Section provides an overview of the practices that plaintiffs
argue constitute illegal forced labor under § 1589. Understanding
these different types of forced labor practices is critical because,
depending on the manner in which courts interpret and apply the
TVPA, some of these practices may or may not be sufficient to
state a § 1589 claim. Note that CoreCivic and GEO contest many
of the factual allegations underlying these claims.

42 See Mia Steinle, Slave Labor Widespread at ICE Detention Centers, Lawyers Say,
PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Sept. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/8X57-WGNJ.
43 See ACLU OF GA., PRISONERS OF PROFIT: IMMIGRANTS AND DETENTION IN GEORGIA
57–58, 61 (2012); Ian Urbina, Using Jailed Migrants as a Pool of Cheap Labor, N.Y. TIMES
(May 24, 2014), https://perma.cc/Z3GS-K4WD.
44 ACLU OF GA., supra note 43, at 61.
45 Id. at 58. For a discussion of CoreCivic and GEO’s objections to the term “solitary
confinement” to describe their practices, see infra note 53.
46 See ACLU OF GA., supra note 43, at 58 n.568.
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1. Mandatory unpaid cleaning assignments.
Claims falling in the first category allege that CoreCivic and
GEO employ standard policies across their facilities requiring detained people to complete “cleaning assignment[s]” on a regular
basis under threat of punishment. 47 This work is not part of the
VWP and is not compensated. GEO and CoreCivic assert that
these cleaning assignments are nothing more than “personal
housekeeping.” 48 But the tasks required by the policies are more
extensive than the image that the personal housekeeping label
evokes. For example:
47F

48F

[GEO’s] Adelanto policy makes detainees responsible for the
cleanliness of walls, floors, sinks, toilets, windows within the
“cell, room, or living area.” At 6 a.m. each Detainee is issued
mops, buckets, brooms, scrub brushes, cleaning rags, and
chemicals, and officers supervise the mandatory cleaning.
Another section of the GEO policy expands the area of responsibility to “all commonly accessible areas of the unit” including “microwaves, tables, and chairs,” and notes “each and
every detainee must participate.” A third plan provides that
on a weekly basis or as needed each unit as a whole is subject
to a “total sanitation mission.” 49
49F

CoreCivic allegedly maintains a similar sanitation policy which
states that:
“[a]ll floors will be swept and mopped on a daily basis,”
“[t]oilet bowls and sinks will be cleaned daily,” “[t]he showers
and floors will be mopped and scrubbed daily,” “[a]ll furniture
will be dusted on a daily basis and cleaned when necessary,”
“[a]ll trash will be emptied daily,” “[w]indows will be washed
weekly or more often when erquired [sic],” “[w]alls and doors
will be wiped daily,” and “[a]ll equipment will be dusted or
cleaned on a daily basis.” 50
50F

Again, these cleaning assignments involve more extensive work
than what might typically be characterized as personal housekeeping. In addition, these tasks go beyond the four low-effort
47 Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-01112, 2020 WL 1550218, at *21 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 1, 2020) appeal docketed, No. 21-55221 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2021).
48 See, e.g., CoreCivic Barrientos Brief, supra note 8, at 18.
49 Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *4 (citations omitted) (quoting a written declaration
submitted by GEO’s counsel).
50 Owino, 2020 WL 1550218, at *21 (alterations in original) (quoting a written declaration submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel citing CoreCivic’s written policies).
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tasks designated as “personal housekeeping” by the PBNDS—
namely, making the bed and keeping personal clutter off the floor,
furniture, and lighting fixtures. 51 In fact, plaintiffs claim that
CoreCivic and GEO rely on detained labor to keep facilities clean;
nondetained janitorial staff are allegedly only hired to clean areas
that detained people are prohibited from accessing. 52
Plaintiffs allege that the consequences for not completing the
cleaning assignments include solitary confinement, 53 housing
transfers, and other sanctions. 54 For example, one plaintiff alleges
that, after he declined to clean areas of the detention facility for
free, GEO officials threw all of his belongings on the floor, threatened him with solitary confinement, and threatened to negatively
influence his ongoing asylum case. 55 According to another plaintiff, “officials threaten[ed] to lock detainees in their cells, suspend
their attorney and personal visits, and prohibit them from interacting with other detained immigrants if they refused to clean areas of the Adelanto Facility for free.” 56
51F

52F

53F

54F

5F

56F

2. Forced VWP participation.
Claims falling in the second category allege that detained
people were forced to participate in the VWP—often obligated to
work while sick, to work extra hours or shifts, or to otherwise participate against their wishes. Detention center authorities allegedly threatened detained people with solitary confinement and
other harms if they refused to work. One plaintiff recounted that
“CoreCivic threatened to transfer him to the Chicken Coop [a
housing unit with subpar conditions], revoke his access to the
commissary, and put him in solitary confinement if he stopped

51

PBNDS, supra note 11, at 405–06.
See infra Part V.B.2.
53 CoreCivic and GEO have objected to the use of the term “solitary confinement” to
describe their isolation practices, which they refer to as “segregation.” See, e.g., Novoa,
2019 WL 7195331, at *5. But reports suggest that, in practice, segregation frequently operates in the same general manner as solitary confinement. See ACLU, supra note 19, at
38–41; IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 36–37. DHS’s internal investigations of
detention centers have “identified serious issues with administrative and disciplinary segregation of detainees.” ACLU, supra note 19, at 38 (quoting OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 21, at 5). As a result, this Comment will continue to use the term “solitary confinement” to refer to instances where detained people are purposely isolated from others.
54 See, e.g., Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *4 (summarizing GEO’s alleged disciplinary
policy).
55 Third Amended Complaint at 30, Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 17-02514 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 26, 2019), 2019 WL 8329599 ¶ 147 [hereinafter Novoa Complaint].
56 Id. at 26.
52
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working, called in sick, refused to change shifts, or encouraged
others to stop working.” 57 In short, these claims assert that forced
labor practices are prevalent even within nominally voluntary
work programs in detention centers.
57F

3. Coerced VWP participation through deprivation.
Claims falling in the third category challenge the VWP itself in
light of the grim reality of modern detention conditions. Although
private detention corporations are obligated to provide detained
people with basic necessities, plaintiffs allege that facilities regularly deprive them of essentials. Plaintiffs in one facility, for example, reported that CoreCivic did not adequately provide “basic
necessities, like food, toothpaste, toilet paper, and soap.” 58 Instead, they had no choice but to purchase these necessities from
the commissary. For people who do not have family members to
fund their commissary accounts, working in the VWP is the only
means of earning commissary credit. In sum, detention corporations allegedly operate a “deprivation scheme” in which they withhold basic necessities in order to coerce people into working in the
VWP and making commissary purchases. 59
58F

59F

4. Coerced participation in an unpaid shadow work
program.
Finally, some plaintiffs allege that detention centers exploited their desire or need to participate in the paid VWP by requiring them to first participate in a de facto shadow work program. In this unpaid work arrangement, “applicants for the [paid
VWP] must work for an arbitrary period of time for no compensation whatsoever, in the hopes that they will eventually be hired
into the [paid VWP].” 60 In these instances, plaintiffs allegedly
worked alongside paid VWP participants completing the same tasks
but were not paid the dollar-per-day minimum allowance. 61 For example, an asylum seeker detained in GEO’s Adelanto Detention
Center alleges that GEO required him to work without pay in the
kitchen from 2 to 8 a.m. for approximately one month before GEO
60F

61F

57
58
59
60
61

Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 951 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *3.
See id. at *4.
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officials permitted him to receive the dollar-per-day payment for
the same tasks through the VWP. 62
Each category of alleged forced labor reviewed above represents a different combination of facts regarding two factors:
(1) the methods that detention facilities use to coerce detained individuals and (2) the types of activities that detention facilities
coerce detained individuals to perform. As this Comment will discuss further, both factors are critical to determine whether conduct amounts to illegal forced labor. Thus, depending on how
courts interpret and apply the TVPA, it is possible that all, some,
or none of these four categories of allegations will result in liability for private detention corporations. This Comment focuses on
the TVPA’s relationship to the latter factor—the types of activities that are coerced—and argues that the TVPA covers all the
activities alleged in each of the four categories. To lay the foundation for this argument, the next Part summarizes the legal status
of forced labor in the United States.
62F

II. PROHIBITIONS ON FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

The Thirteenth Amendment

Forced labor is illegal in the United States. The Constitution
may seem the most obvious protection against systematic forced
labor. Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits “slavery”
and “involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” 63 This constitutional protection is not limited to the context of African American
slavery and extends to both citizens and noncitizens. 64
Because immigration detention is civil rather than criminal
detention, people detained awaiting immigration proceedings do
not fall within the Amendment’s criminal punishment exception
clause. Hence, some scholars argue that forced labor in immigration detention centers violates the Thirteenth Amendment. 65 But
Thirteenth Amendment claims are difficult to win.
One obstacle is that existing case law provides no clear definition of “slavery” or “involuntary servitude.” The Supreme Court
63F

64F

65F

62

Novoa Complaint, supra note 55, at 28–29.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
64 See Sinha, supra note 10, at 41–42.
65 See generally id.; Jamila S. Cambridge, Note, Land of the Free? An Examination
of the Constitutionality of Forced Labor in U.S. Immigrant Detention Centers, 63 HOW. L.J.
405 (2020).
63
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has, thus far, only found Thirteenth Amendment violations in
cases where the victim was subject to “the use or threatened use
of physical or legal coercion.” 66 Physical coercion involves the
threat or use of physical force to compel labor, such as physically
injuring a person who fails to complete a task or physically restraining a person from leaving the workplace. 67 Legal coercion
occurs when the victim has no choice but to work or be subject to
a legal sanction, such as a criminal charge. For example, states
cannot pass laws that criminalize the nonperformance of labor
contracts. 68 Whether the Thirteenth Amendment extends to
forced labor obtained by other means, such as psychological coercion, is unclear. The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this
question, but it has suggested that applying the Thirteenth
Amendment to situations where means other than physical or legal coercion are employed would be a significant departure from
its past Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 69
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized an unwritten but far-reaching civic duty exception to the Thirteenth
Amendment. Under this exception, the Amendment does not prohibit “State or Federal Governments from compelling their citizens, by threat of criminal sanction, to perform certain civic duties.” 70 Applying this civic duty exception, the Court has rejected
challenges to practices such as jury duty and the military draft. 71
6F

67F

68F

69F

70F

71F

66

United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 944 (1988).
See United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1001 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court’s jury instructions defining involuntary servitude through physical coercion as
including “restraint, physical restraint, locking somebody up, or in some other way restraining the person . . . [and] physically injuring the person”).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146–47 (1914) (striking down a
law authorizing the “arrest of [a] convict for violation of his labor contract” with a surety
who had paid fines or fees to the state related to the person’s criminal conviction); Bailey
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243–45 (1911) (striking down a law permitting criminal fraud
convictions to be based solely on failure of defendants to perform labor contracts for which
they had accepted advance payment).
69 See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944:
67

[O]ur precedents clearly define a Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion.
The guarantee of freedom from involuntary servitude has never been interpreted
specifically to prohibit compulsion of labor by other means, such as psychological
coercion. We draw no conclusions from this historical survey about the potential
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.
70
71

Id.
Id.
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Whether the civic duty exception extends to governmentcompelled forced labor performed by detained people is unresolved. 72 The U.S. government has sometimes attempted to use
the civic duty exception to justify forced labor performed by people
detained while awaiting criminal trials and people detained while
awaiting immigration proceedings given that this labor cannot be
justified under the criminal exception clause because neither
group has been convicted of a crime. In Channer v. Hall, 73 the Fifth
Circuit held that a government-run detention facility did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment when it compelled a detained immigrant to work in the food services department of the facility
because such conduct fell under the civic duty exception: “[T]he
federal government is entitled to require a communal contribution by an [Immigration and Naturalization Service] detainee.” 74
In McGarry v. Pallito, 75 however, the Second Circuit reached
a different conclusion in the pretrial detention context. The
plaintiff claimed that the prison had violated the Thirteenth
Amendment by compelling him to work in the prison laundry before he had been convicted of a crime. The Second Circuit first
assumed without deciding that the government could compel
someone detained awaiting a criminal trial to perform “personally
related housekeeping chores” without violating the Thirteenth
Amendment. 76 However, the court ruled out the possibility of an
exception where the housekeeping chores were not truly “personal” but instead were well within the Thirteenth Amendment’s
scope of “compulsory service of one to another.” 77 The Supreme
Court has not weighed in on this issue.
Importantly, each case in which the Supreme Court has recognized a civic duty exception has involved service to the government—not to private entities, such as for-profit corporations.
Courts have thus far rejected the argument that the civic duty
exception extends to GEO and CoreCivic as for-profit government
contractors. 78
72F

73F

74F

75F

76F

7F

78F

72 For an analysis of whether the civic duty exception applies to forced labor in immigration detention centers, see Cambridge, supra note 65, at 411–19.
73 112 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1997).
74 Id. at 219.
75 687 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 2012).
76 Id. at 514.
77 Id. at 513–14 (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906)).
78 See Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-02514, 2018 WL 3343494, at *13 (C.D.
Cal. June 21, 2018) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to
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Despite the Supreme Court’s tendency to narrowly interpret
the meaning of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” under Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court has recognized
broad congressional authority to enact legislation under the
power granted to it by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Section 2 states that “Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.” 79 The Court has long held that
this clause endowed Congress with the power to “pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States.” 80
The exact scope of this power remains largely undefined. For
example, some have questioned whether Congress’s enactment of
federal hate crimes legislation was a proper exercise of Thirteenth
Amendment power. 81 It is well-settled, however, that Congress’s
power to legislate under Section 2 is not coterminous with the definitions of “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” directly prohibited by Section 1. Rather, the types of “conduct that [Congress]
may make criminally punishable or civilly remediable extend far
beyond the actual imposition of slavery or involuntary servitude.” 82 Pursuant to this authority as well as its power to regulate
interstate commerce, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, discussed next.
79F

80F

81F

82F

B.

The Trafficking Victims Protection Act

Enacted in 2000, the TVPA addressed a broad range of activities related to sex trafficking, involuntary servitude, peonage, debt
bondage, slavery, and forced labor. 83 Although the term “human
trafficking” evokes ideas of smuggling women across international
borders for purposes of forced prostitution, the TVPA extends far
83F

dismiss) (holding that “the rationale underlying the civic duty exception and its historical
usage” rendered it “inapplicable to a claim against a private corporation contracting with
the federal government to run an immigration detention facility”); Owino v. CoreCivic,
Inc., No. 17-CV-1112, 2018 WL 2193644, at *10 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2018) (order granting
in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to dismiss) (holding that the civic duty
exception could not shield CoreCivic from forced labor allegations because it “is a private
entity, not a government”); Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc. 113 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1133 (D. Colo.
2015) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to dismiss) (same).
79 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
80 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
81 See Jennifer Mason McAward, The Thirteenth Amendment, Human Trafficking,
and Hate Crimes, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 829, 834–45 (2016).
82 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).
83 22 U.S.C. § 7102.
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beyond this conventional conception of trafficking. During the
congressional debates preceding the enactment of the TVPA, representatives clashed over how the proposed legislation would define “trafficking.” 84 Members of Congress disagreed, for example,
over the extent to which sex work, such as prostitution, should or
would be swept into a single, catchall definition of “trafficking.” 85
Inability to reach a compromise ultimately led Congress to leave
the term without a single clear definition. Rather, Congress chose
to dodge this question by defining “severe forms of trafficking” rather than “trafficking” more broadly. 86
The practical implication of this history is that the operative
definition of “trafficking” under federal law today is generally considered to be the TVPA definition of “severe forms of trafficking.” 87
This definition includes certain types of sex trafficking as well as
“the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force,
fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.” 88 This definition of
“human trafficking” is considerably more expansive than the stereotype of a foreign woman forced into prostitution.
Critically, the TVPA also created several offenses without
reference to the term “trafficking.” Perhaps the most important
among these provisions was a sweeping new prohibition on forced
labor. Before the TVPA, federal statutory protection from forced
labor was largely limited to a prohibition on involuntary servitude enacted in 1948 (18 U.S.C. § 1584), which criminalized
“knowingly and willfully hold[ing] to involuntary servitude or
sell[ing] into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other
person for any term.” 89 But the statute did not define “involuntary
servitude.” In United States v. Kozminski, 90 the Supreme Court
held that, absent a definition from Congress, the term “involuntary servitude” should only include conduct that was understood
84F

85F

86F

87F

8F

89F

90F

84 For a thorough discussion of the contentious debates and diversity of interests involved in the passage of the TVPA, see ALICIA W. PETERS, RESPONDING TO HUMAN
TRAFFICKING: SEX, GENDER, AND CULTURE IN THE LAW 43–70 (2015).
85 See id. at 61 (explaining that “[o]ne of the main controversies during [TVPA] negotiations” was “the relationship between prostitution and trafficking and whether individuals participating in a criminalized act could be considered victims”).
86 See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11).
87 See PETERS, supra note 84, at 63, 75–77.
88 22 U.S.C. § 7102(11)(B).
89 18 U.S.C. § 1584(a) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
683, 773).
90 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
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to be prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment at the time of the
statute’s enactment. 91 This limited the § 1584 prohibition on involuntary servitude to cases where victims were compelled by
physical or legal coercion. 92
This holding led to a rather unsympathetic result in
Kozminski. The Kozminski defendants had appealed their convictions under § 1584 for coercing two men with disabilities into laboring seventeen hours per day without pay or adequate living
conditions. 93 The Court reversed their convictions, however, because the district court’s jury instructions permitted the jury to
consider methods of coercion (such as psychological coercion)
other than “physical or legal coercion.” 94
In designing the TVPA, Congress expressly sought to expand
federal prohibitions on forced labor to cover “severe forms of
worker exploitation that do not rise to the level of involuntary
servitude as defined in Kozminski.” 95 To fill this gap, Congress
created a provision entitled “Forced Labor,” codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1589, which complemented but did not replace the existing
§ 1584 prohibition on involuntary servitude. The original version
of § 1589 enacted in 2000 prohibited:
91F

92F

93F

94F

95F

knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the labor or services of a
person—
(1) by threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint
against, that person or another person;
(2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to
cause the person to believe that, if the person did not
perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or
the legal process. 96
96F

91

See id. at 944–45:

The pivotal phrase, “involuntary servitude,” clearly was borrowed from the
Thirteenth Amendment. . . . In the absence of any contrary indications, we
therefore give effect to congressional intent by construing “involuntary servitude” in a way consistent with the understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment
that prevailed at the time of § 1584’s enactment.
92

See supra Part II.A.
See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934–35.
94 See id. at 949, 953.
95 H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1380, 1393.
96 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
93
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Two aspects of this statute are notable. First, Congress
avoided the Thirteenth Amendment’s language of “slavery” or
“involuntary servitude,” thus decoupling the statute from the
Supreme Court’s existing interpretations of those terms. Second,
Congress included the broad term “threats of serious harm” in an
attempt to include nonviolent coercion and thus supersede
Kozminski. 97 Taken together, these characteristics make § 1589 a
significant expansion of federal forced labor protections.
In addition to its criminal provisions, the TVPA contains numerous other provisions, such as grants for victims’ services organizations. As a result, every few years, Congress has passed a
reauthorization act to continue certain TVPA programs and reauthorize the appropriation of funds. 98 These reauthorization acts
have often included amendments to the TVPA’s criminal and civil
prohibitions. The 2003 and 2008 reauthorizations contain the two
most important amendments related to § 1589.
The 2003 reauthorization of the TVPA, known as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 99 provided victims with a powerful new tool: a private civil cause of
action. 100 This provision came in response to critiques from advocacy groups that the TVPA’s emphasis on criminal prosecution
was inconsistent with the needs of victims. 101 The private cause
of action enables victims to sue defendants for violating the
TVPA, regardless of whether a federal prosecutor decides to pursue a criminal charge. According to a database maintained by the
Human Trafficking Legal Center, “[i]n the 15 years since Congress
created the civil provision under the [TVPRA], trafficking survivors have brought more than 270 cases alleging forced labor and
involuntary servitude in a wide array of contexts, ranging from
slaughterhouses to construction sites, from nursing homes to
mansions.” 102
97F

98F

9F

10F

10F

102F

97

H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 100–01.
Reauthorizations of the TVPA of 2000 have been passed in 2003, 2006, 2008, 2013,
2018, and 2019. See OFF. TO MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW, https://perma.cc/XJ52-6FAQ.
99 Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003).
100 TVPRA § 4, 117 Stat. at 2878–79.
101 See Jennifer S. Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil
Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1661–63 (2007)
(discussing Congress’s motivations for including a private right of action in the 2003
reauthorization).
102 LEVY, supra note 2, at 3.
98
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With the 2008 reauthorization, Congress clarified the types
of coercion prohibited by the Act. This was likely in response to
defendants’ arguments that courts had improperly instructed juries on the meaning of “serious harm,” a term that the original
text of § 1589 left undefined. 103 The new, expansive definition of
“serious harm” includes
103F

any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a
reasonable person of the same background and in the same
circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or
services in order to avoid incurring that harm. 104
104F

Thus, § 1589 provides a robust prohibition on forced labor that is
significantly more expansive than its statutory predecessors as
well as the protection offered by Section 1 of the Thirteenth
Amendment. 105
105F

III. CURRENT IMMIGRATION DETENTION TVPA CASES
Beginning in 2014, a small coalition of immigrants’ rights advocates set its sights on using the TVPA’s broad forced labor prohibition and powerful civil suit provision to demand justice for
people in immigration detention centers. Because advocates view
forced labor in private detention facilities not as occasional misconduct but as systematic operating policy, they have pursued
these claims as class actions rather than as individual suits.

103 See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 150–51 (1st Cir. 2004) (rejecting
defendants’ argument that district court’s jury instruction defined “serious harm” too
broadly but noting that the phrase “creates a potential for jury misunderstanding as to
the nature of the pressure that is proscribed” (emphasis in original)), vacated on other
grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005).
104 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2).
105 The current text of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, in relevant part, creates civil and criminal
liability for:

(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by
any one of, or by any combination of, the following means—
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or
another person;
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person
to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that
person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint.
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Given the ten-year statute of limitations on § 1589 claims and the
vast number of people detained in these facilities each year, classes in these cases have the potential to include hundreds of thousands of members.
Currently, there are five TVPA class action suits pending
against GEO and CoreCivic in federal court. A sixth suit was filed,
but has been stayed as duplicative of another proceeding. 106 Thus
far, these suits have overcome some major hurdles. Classes have
been certified in three of these cases: Menocal v. GEO Group, 107
Owino v. CoreCivic, 108 and Novoa v. GEO Group. 109 Three cases
have already survived one round of interlocutory appellate review
on important questions of law before the Tenth, Eleventh, and
Fifth Circuits: Menocal v. GEO Group, 110 Barrientos v. CoreCivic, 111 and Gonzalez v. CoreCivic. 112 It remains uncertain
whether plaintiffs will succeed on the merits or win a favorable
settlement. Nevertheless, these suits represent cause for optimism for immigrants’ rights advocates, who are accustomed to an
immigration detention system that seems to routinely violate detained individuals’ rights with impunity.
If these lawsuits succeed, the immediate and long-term financial ramifications for the private prison industry are dramatic. Scholar Jonathon Booth estimates that a nationwide settlement of these TVPA claims “could easily cost hundreds of
millions of dollars, not counting reputational harm.” 113 Perhaps
most importantly, if these claims succeed, private detention operators will be forced to radically alter the way they run their facilities. For example, without a guaranteed supply of forced labor,
detention corporations may need to hire nondetained employees
who must receive minimum wage. 114 Professor Jacqueline Stevens,
who has conducted groundbreaking research on labor in immigration detention centers, estimates that labor performed by detained
106F

107F

108F

109F

10F

1F

12F

13F

14F

106 See Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-2573, 2018 WL 1621543, at *6 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 4, 2018).
107 320 F.R.D. 258 (D. Colo. 2017), aff’d, 882 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2018).
108 No. 17-CV-01112, 2020 WL 1550218 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020).
109 No. 17-CV-02514, 2019 WL 7195331 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019).
110 882 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2018).
111 951 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020).
112 986 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2021).
113 Jonathon Booth, Ending Forced Labor in ICE Detention Centers: A New Approach,
34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 573, 606 (2020).
114 See id. at 606–08 (discussing the potential effects of these TVPA class action suits
on the private prison industry).
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people saves GEO Group between $33 and $72 million and CoreCivic an estimated $30 to $77 million annually. 115
In statements to the public and to shareholders, the private
detention industry has projected confidence about the outcome of
the suits. GEO told shareholders in February 2019 that a victory
for plaintiffs in these suits was neither “probable nor reasonably
estimable.” 116 Further, GEO assured shareholders that it did “not
expect the outcome of any pending claims or legal proceedings to
have a material adverse effect on its financial condition, results
of operations or cash flows.” 117 But GEO’s communications with
ICE—obtained by Stevens via Freedom of Information Act requests—have painted a different picture. GEO stressed that the
legal costs in just one of these suits had already topped $1.6 million, with millions more expected in discovery costs and “potential
damages . . . in the tens of millions.” 118
Given these high stakes, it is no surprise that CoreCivic and
GEO have mounted formidable legal defenses to these suits. This
Comment focuses on one of these defenses, namely, that the types
of tasks detained people claim they are forced to perform do not
qualify as “labor or services” under § 1589. Before analyzing this
particular legal argument, however, it is helpful to understand
the broad strokes of this pending litigation. Because these lawsuits are ongoing, this Part does not attempt to provide a comprehensive summary of these suits, but rather to spotlight some of
the most important legal developments. 119
15F

16F

17F

18F

19F

A.

Classes and Claims

The first of this cluster of TVPA suits, Menocal v. GEO Group,
was filed in the U.S. District Court for Colorado in 2014 by individuals detained at the Aurora Detention Facility in Colorado. The
Menocal plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the GEO-operated facility enforced a “Housing Unit Sanitation Policy” that required
them to complete unpaid cleaning assignments—janitorial

115

Stevens, supra note 15, at 402.
Betsy Swan, Private Prison Bosses Beg Taxpayers to Pay Human-Trafficking Lawsuit Bills, DAILY BEAST (July 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/QAB4-692Q.
117 Id.
118 Id.; see Stevens, supra note 34, at 369–71.
119 This Comment focuses only on the plaintiffs’ TVPA claims, but plaintiffs in these
suits have also stated claims based on allegations of unjust enrichment and violations of
minimum wage laws. For additional commentary on this litigation, see generally Stevens,
supra note 34; see also Booth, supra note 113, at 601–03.
116

2021]

Defining Forced Labor

1225

maintenance of the facility—under threat of punishment, as discussed in Part I.C. 120 Because plaintiffs claimed that the Housing
Unit Sanitation Policy was a facility-wide policy that required all
detained individuals to participate, the Menocal plaintiffs brought
their TVPA claims on behalf of everyone detained at Aurora in the
ten years prior to the filing of the suit. 121 Despite GEO’s vigorous
opposition to class certification, the district court certified the
Aurora TVPA class. 122 The Tenth Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal. 123
Evidence uncovered during discovery thus far appears to support some of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations that GEO employed
a uniform policy of mandatory unpaid janitorial work. For example, detained people received a handbook upon arrival stating
that “detainees in a housing unit [or dorm] are required to keep
clean and sanitary all commonly accessible areas of the housing
unit [or dorm], including walls, floors, windows, window ledges,
showers, sinks, toilets, tables, and chairs.” 124 As discussed in
Part I.C, CoreCivic is alleged to operate a similar uniform policy
in its detention facilities.
Some of these TVPA suits have seized upon this uniformity
of policy to go a step further than the Menocal plaintiffs. If GEO
and CoreCivic employ the same policies in all their facilities
across the country, then why limit a putative class to people detained in a single facility? Owino v. CoreCivic, the next federal
TVPA suit, which was filed in 2017 by individuals detained at
Otay Mesa Detention Center in California, pursued this strategy.
Like the Menocal plaintiffs, the Owino plaintiffs allege that CoreCivic maintains a policy of mandatory unpaid janitorial assignments. 125 Unlike Menocal, however, the Owino plaintiffs represent not only people in a single detention facility, but people
detained by CoreCivic nationwide. 126 Despite CoreCivic’s vigorous
opposition, the district court certified the Owino plaintiffs’ proposed nationwide TVPA class comprised of everyone who was
“detained at a CoreCivic facility” within the ten-year statute of
120F

12F

12F

123F

124F

125F

126F

120

Menocal, 320 F.R.D. at 261.
Id. at 262.
122 Id. at 261.
123 See Menocal, 882 F.3d at 910.
124 Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Decertification at 3,
Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 14-CV-02887 (D. Colo. Oct. 26, 2020) (alterations in original).
125 Owino, 2020 WL 1550218, at *1.
126 Id.
121
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limitations who had “cleaned areas of the facilities above and beyond the personal housekeeping tasks enumerated in [the ICE
PBNDS] . . . under threat of discipline.” 127
Though pursuing claims through the kind of large, nationwide class certified in Owino has significant advantages in terms
of its potential to affect systemic change and provide relief to victims across the country, this strategy also has its drawbacks. It
opens plaintiffs up to attacks over whether the circumstances and
conduct in so many different detention centers are similar enough
to be resolved in a single action. 128 Perhaps recognizing these pros
and cons, the next case in which class certification was granted
has taken a hybrid approach.
In Novoa v. GEO Group, people detained in the Adelanto
Detention Center in California filed suit in 2017 alleging numerous theories of TVPA liability. 129 Plaintiffs requested both a nationwide TVPA class and an Adelanto-specific TVPA class. 130 The district court certified both classes. 131
The nationwide class is comprised of all people detained in
GEO immigration facilities in the United States within the statute of limitations (excluding class members in the Menocal suit
due to their separate ongoing litigation) and is based on GEO’s
allegedly uniform Housing Unit Sanitation Policy of mandatory
unpaid cleaning assignments. 132 GEO, however, continues to deny
the existence of any uniform national Housing Unit Sanitation
Policy and contends that the cleaning policies of each of its facilities are different.
The claims of the Adelanto-specific class focus on the remaining three theories of forced labor liability discussed in Part I.C:
forced participation in Adelanto’s official VWP, coerced participation in Adelanto’s unofficial shadow unpaid work program, and
the deprivation-scheme theory of TVPA liability. 133 Plaintiffs argue, for example, that they “often lack sufficient food, clothing, or
personal hygiene items, and work without pay only to receive
127F

128F

129F

130F

13F

132F

13F

127

Id. at *7, *31.
See, e.g., Owino v. CoreCivic, No. 17-CV-1112, at *7–11 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021)
(order denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration).
129 Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *1.
130 Id. at *10.
131 Id. at *20.
132 Id. at *10.
133 Id. at *5, *10.
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such necessities as gifts from officers, or to increase their commissary balance and purchase those necessities.” 134
Although winning class certification was an important initial
victory for plaintiffs in these cases, significant obstacles remain.
CoreCivic and GEO continue to argue for decertification, both on
motions to the district courts as well as on appeal. 135 Thus, class
certification is still uncertain, and plaintiffs’ victories may be
tenuous.
134F

135F

B.

Foundational Appellate Victories

CoreCivic and GEO have vigorously defended against these
suits, attacking both the factual accuracy of plaintiffs’ claims and
their legal sufficiency. One critical pillar of their defense strategy
is the assertion that, regardless of the truth of the forced labor
allegations, plaintiffs’ § 1589 claims must fail because this statute
does not apply in the immigration detention context. Thus far,
however, both the Eleventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have rejected this claim. These rulings represent major victories for the
plaintiffs in the instant cases, but also for immigrants’ rights litigation more broadly. They represent judicial rejection of the argument that immigration detention is a unique context where legal protections do not apply in equal force.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Barrientos v. CoreCivic, was the first
circuit court to rule on the question of the TVPA’s applicability to
private detention facilities. The Barrientos plaintiffs are people
who are currently or formerly detained at Stewart Detention
Center in Georgia. 136 In contrast to the TVPA cases discussed previously, the Barrientos plaintiffs’ § 1589 claims focus solely on
forced labor through the VWP. 137 The plaintiffs advance a deprivation theory of TVPA liability and also allege that they were
threatened and retaliated against if they refused to work in the
VWP or desired to change shifts, take a day off, or otherwise did
not submit to CoreCivic’s VWP-related demands. 138
136F

137F

138F

134

Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *5.
See Notice of Motion to Decertify the Class, Novoa v. GEO Group, Inc., No. 17-CV02514 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2020). The Ninth Circuit recently agreed to hear CoreCivic’s
interlocutory appeal of the district court’s order granting class certification in Owino v.
CoreCivic. See Order for Permission to Appeal, Owino v. CoreCivic, No. 21-80003 (9th Cir.
Mar. 10, 2021).
136 Amended Complaint at 1, Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-CV-00070 (M.D.
Ga. Oct. 16, 2020), 2020 WL 7021904 [hereinafter Barrientos Complaint].
137 Id. at 10–13.
138 See id. at 14–19.
135
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CoreCivic argued before the Eleventh Circuit that Congress
did not intend for the TVPA to extend to immigrants who are lawfully detained under government orders in detention centers.
CoreCivic thus asserted “that the TVPA (specifically § 1589) can
never apply in the specific context of a ‘federally mandated voluntary work program in a detention setting,’ even where the work
performed through that program is obtained through, for example, force, physical restraint, or threats of serious harm.” 139 Notably, the Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief in support of neither party but firmly against CoreCivic’s stance of
complete immunity from the TVPA. The brief argued that “the
TVPA does not contain an implicit exception for private providers
of immigration detention services” and that, in fact, “Congress
has repeatedly emphasized that it seeks to stamp out any use of
forced labor by federal contractors.” 140 The Eleventh Circuit held
that there was no exception to TVPA liability for private contractors operating federal immigration facilities. 141
CoreCivic, however, did not abandon this strategy following
its Eleventh Circuit loss. Instead, it advanced the same argument before the Fifth Circuit in Gonzalez v. CoreCivic. 142 Martha
Gonzalez was held at two different CoreCivic-owned facilities and
filed suit seeking to represent a nationwide TVPA class of “[a]ll
civil immigration detainees who performed labor for no pay or at
a rate of compensation of $1.00 to $2.00 per day for work performed
for CoreCivic at any detention facility owned or operated by it from
February 20, 2007 to the applicable opt-out date, inclusive.” 143
In response, CoreCivic again argued that conduct within immigration detention facilities should be exempt from TVPA protection, but lost on this argument at the district court. 144 The Fifth
Circuit accepted the case on interlocutory appeal to decide
“[w]hether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities.” 145 The grant of interlocutory review
sparked hope for the private detention industry that the Fifth
139F

140F

14F

142F

143F

14F

145F

139

Barrientos, 951 F.3d at 1275–76.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7–8,
Barrientos v. CoreCivic, 951 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-15081), 2019 WL 1468236,
at *7–8.
141 Barrientos, 951 F.3d at 1280.
142 See Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., 986 F.3d 536, 537 (5th Cir. 2021).
143 Complaint at 19, Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-CV-169 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2018).
144 Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-CV-169, 2019 WL 2572540, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 1, 2019).
145 Gonzalez, 986 F.3d at 538.
140
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Circuit would split with the Eleventh Circuit, thus increasing the
chances that the Supreme Court might intervene with a favorable
ruling. But in another major victory for plaintiffs and immigrants’
rights supporters, the court held that “§ 1589(a) does not contain
a categorical exemption—not even an ambiguous one—for work
programs in detention facilities.” 146 Thus, both circuits that have
ruled on this issue have rejected CoreCivic’s theory of categorical
exemption.
In a recent analysis of these suits, Booth concluded that the
“TVPA cases against GEO Group and CoreCivic continue to move
inexorably toward class certification and trial” and that these
claims are likely to be successful. 147 Similarly, Jennifer Safstrom
of the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection recently called these lawsuits “key drivers of reform” that have “established new precedent and expanded the context in which the
Thirteenth Amendment is applicable” via the TVPA. 148 Private
detention corporations appear to have lost their initial bids to
claim a complete exemption from the TVPA as private government contractors operating detention centers. But significant obstacles still remain. Defendants have doubled down on the argument that the activities alleged by the plaintiffs do not rise to the
level of “labor or services” actionable under the TVPA. This Comment now turns to examine the merits of this argument.
146F

147F

148F

IV. INTERPRETING “LABOR OR SERVICES” IN 18 U.S.C. § 1589
Because § 1589 does not define “labor or services,” parties often argue for differing interpretations of this term. Defendants
frequently attempt to escape liability by arguing that the activities performed by victims do not amount to “labor or services” actionable under the TVPA, and thus are not covered by the statute,
regardless of whether the defendants used force or coercion. In
the current immigration detention cases, courts once again face
the challenge of defining the boundaries of “labor or services” under § 1589.
Private detention defendants advance a two-tiered argument. First, they argue that, although the plain language of

146

Id. at 539.
Booth, supra note 113, at 610.
148 Jennifer Safstrom, Thirteenth Amendment Litigation in the Immigration Detention Context, 26 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 232 (2020).
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§ 1589 refers broadly to any labor or services, Congress was narrowly focused on transnational human trafficking activities. Defendants assert that their alleged conduct is far outside the realm
of paradigmatic human trafficking schemes that Congress intended to target with the TVPA. Second, they argue for a limited
interpretation of “labor or services” that would—at a minimum—
exclude requiring detained people to complete housekeeping
tasks under threat of punishment. They assert that § 1589 was
not intended to encompass mere housekeeping tasks. This reading would permit § 1589 claims premised on forced participation
in the VWP or the shadow unpaid work program, but would bar
claims premised solely on tasks defined as housekeeping.
Legislative history and twenty years of precedent interpreting the TVPA, however, provide little support for either of the defendants’ interpretations. This Part first examines the merits of
the congressional intent argument and then looks to TVPA case
law. Both analyses support the conclusion that the activities plaintiffs allege they were compelled to perform—including housekeeping tasks—constitute labor actionable under the TVPA.
A.

Examining the Context and Legislative History of § 1589

Both GEO and CoreCivic have asked courts to dismiss the
TVPA claims against them by arguing that the conduct Congress
intended the TVPA to target is wholly distinct from the conduct
plaintiffs allege. CoreCivic, for example, has argued that “the sole
purpose of the TVPA was to target, deter, and prosecute international human trafficking, and protect trafficking victims (particularly women and children).” 149 But this emphasis on the TVPA’s
focus on trafficking as a transnational crime affecting women and
children is misplaced, especially with respect to its forced labor
provision.
Notably, § 1589 contains no references to human trafficking
or any qualifying language referring to an international or gendered element. Rather, this provision is entitled “Forced labor”
and contains broad language. 150 In contrast, the subsequent section, 18 U.S.C. § 1590—also enacted as part of the original
TVPA—is entitled “Trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery,
149F

150F

149 CoreCivic Barrientos Brief, supra note 8, at 21. For an example of GEO advancing
this argument, see Motion to Dismiss at 12–13, Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 14-CV02887, 2014 WL 6697253 (D. Colo. 2014).
150 See 18 U.S.C. § 1589.
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involuntary servitude, or forced labor.” 151 Interpreting “forced labor” to require an implicit trafficking element would render the
subsequent offense of “trafficking with respect to . . . forced labor”
redundant. This strongly suggests that Congress did not conceive
of § 1589 as a trafficking offense at all.
This reading is consistent with the context and legislative
history of § 1589. Specifically, the TVPA’s express references to
Kozminski support the view of § 1589 as a forced labor prohibition
rather than a transnational human trafficking prohibition. As
discussed in Part II.B, Kozminski had significant influence on the
design of § 1589. 152 The case involved two adult male U.S. citizens
who were forced to work without adequate pay or living conditions on a family farm in Michigan. 153 There was no transnational
crime ring, no trafficking across international (or even interstate)
borders, no women or children, no immigrants, nor any of the
other elements that would mark the case as one that detention
corporations argue the TVPA was intended to target. Even so,
there is clear evidence that Congress intended the facts of
Kozminski to be well within the reach of § 1589’s prohibition on
forced labor. The Conference Report, for example, discussed the
proposed § 1589 in the following way:
15F

152F

153F

In order to address issues raised by the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Kozminski, the
agreement creates a new section 1589 on forced labor. . . .
Section 1589 will provide federal prosecutors with the tools
to combat severe forms of worker exploitation that do not rise
to the level of involuntary servitude as defined in Kozminski. 154
154F

Thus, reading § 1589 as only applicable to trafficking with a
transnational element would paradoxically rule out liability on
facts identical to those in Kozminski.
Although it is conceivable that Congress could have intended
to eliminate the restrictive Kozminski coercion standard only for
international human trafficking cases and not for purely domestic
cases like Kozminski itself, this would be a strained reading of the
legislative history. The Conference Report refers to § 1589 as a
tool to combat “severe forms of worker exploitation” in a general
151 18 U.S.C. § 1590. This provision creates liability for “[w]hoever knowingly recruits,
harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means, any person for labor or services.”
18 U.S.C. § 1590(a).
152 See supra Part II.B.
153 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934–35.
154 H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 5, 100–01 (citations omitted).
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sense without any modifiers indicating that Congress was only
concerned with exploitation involving some sort of transnational
element. 155 Again—unlike other TVPA-created provisions—§ 1589
contains no indication that trafficking is an element of the offense.
Even assuming arguendo that § 1589 applies only to trafficking cases, other provisions of the TVPA belie the contention that
trafficking necessarily contains a transnational element. For example, the TVPA called for the establishment of a “Task Force to
Monitor and Combat Trafficking” with responsibilities including
“significant research and resource information on domestic and
international trafficking.” 156 Furthermore, this interpretation is
consistent with the long-held position of the U.S. government.
The first Trafficking in Persons Report issued by the U.S. State
Department in 2001 in order to fulfill its obligations under the
TVPA noted that “[t]rafficking occurs across borders and within
countries.” 157 Thus, the context and legislative history of the
TVPA support what the plain language of § 1589 suggests: that
the statute applies to a broad range of cases regardless of any
transnational trafficking element.
Private detention corporations also argue that Congress “could
not have intended the TVPA to prohibit immigration officials or
their private partners from requiring immigration detainees to
participate in routine housekeeping tasks in and around the facilities they are lawfully detained in.” 158 These chores, defendants
argue, are far outside the TVPA’s target of “modern-day slavery.” 159 Yet routine housekeeping—in other words, domestic labor—is one of the most persistent forms of forced labor.
The TVPA’s legislative history shows that Congress was well
aware of the issue of forced domestic labor and intended § 1589 to
reach this conduct. First, before the passage of the TVPA, § 1584
(the involuntary servitude statute) was regularly used to prosecute
cases in which defendants forced victims to complete domestic
15F

156F

157F

158F

159F

155
156
157

Id.
22 U.S.C. § 7103(d)(3).
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2001 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 1 (2001) (emphasis

added).
158 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Complaint at 7, Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 17-CV-01112, 2017 WL 8948699
(S.D. Cal. 2017).
159 CoreCivic Barrientos Brief, supra note 8, at 9–10.
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housekeeping. 160 Excluding housekeeping labor from § 1589
would thus be inconsistent with Congress’s express desire to expand the protections of § 1584. Second, the Conference Report
explained that, under the provisions of § 1589, “it is intended that
prosecutors will be able to bring more cases in which individuals
have been trafficked into domestic service, an increasingly common occurrence.” 161 To hold that housekeeping falls outside the
scope of “labor or services” protected by the TVPA would thus directly contradict Congress’s well-documented intention to protect
victims forced to carry out this category of work.
Finally, it bears mentioning that the attempt to cast housekeeping tasks as separate from the modern slavery that the TVPA
was arguably enacted to halt is historically unfounded, ignoring
the well-documented history of “house slaves” in the United
States and the continued problem of domestic servitude. In the
pre–Civil War United States, enslaved people were not only
forced to work in the fields; many were charged with exclusively
domestic duties, such as cooking, cleaning, and caring for children. 162 Moreover, forced domestic labor continues to be a major
issue today. The U.S. State Department defines “involuntary domestic servitude” as a prevalent form of “modern slavery.” 163
Housekeeping chores have always been, and continue to be, at the
center of slavery and servitude. Attempts to exclude these activities
from the definition of “labor or services” under § 1589 on the basis
that they are not akin to modern slavery are therefore groundless.
160F

16F

162F

163F

B.

Examining § 1589 Case Law

Private detention corporations’ argument that courts should
adopt a limiting interpretation of “labor or services” that would
not include chores or domestic labor is not unique. Defendants
facing § 1589 liability for offenses involving domestic labor have
regularly advanced this argument over the statute’s two-decade
history. Courts, however, have consistently rejected the argument

160 See, e.g., United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1000–01 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming
defendant’s conviction under § 1584 for holding a household servant in involuntary servitude); Kimes v. United States, 939 F.2d 776, 777 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming defendant’s
conviction under § 1584 for forcing young women to work as “maids”).
161 H.R. REP. NO. 106-939, at 101.
162 See PAUL E. TEED & MELISSA LADD TEED, DAILY LIFE OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
SLAVES IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 27–29 (2020).
163 OFF. TO MONITOR & COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, What is Modern Slavery?,
https://perma.cc/V68E-8PQ6.
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that the statute covers only the “paradigmatic forced labor situation” of “onerous, required, and taxing” labor—and other suggested limiting interpretations—in favor of adopting the plain
meaning of “labor or services.” 164 As a result, courts have interpreted “labor or services” to include housekeeping and domestic
tasks. In addition, these cases show a substantial history of application to purely domestic cases with no transnational element.
GEO and CoreCivic have cited the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Toviave 165 for the proposition that courts should
exercise “interpretive restraint” rather than applying § 1589 in
accordance with its plain meaning. 166 In Toviave, the defendant
served as the guardian for four children and was criminally prosecuted under § 1589 for requiring the children to do household
chores and physically abusing them. 167 The court held that the
defendant’s behavior was not prohibited by § 1589, and that he
should instead be prosecuted under state law child abuse statutes
rather than the federal forced labor statute. 168 CoreCivic has argued that, in Toviave, “[a]lthough chores such as taking out the
garbage and mowing the lawn ‘[were] “labor” in the economic
sense,’ the court refused to read § 1589’s reference to ‘labor’ to
reach that circumstance.” 169
The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected this characterization of its
Toviave decision in a subsequent case, United States v. Callahan. 170
The victims in this case—a woman with severe developmental
disabilities and her minor daughter—originally lived with the defendants as roommates. 171 Over time, the defendants began to severely abuse the victims and “forced [the adult victim] to clean
the apartment, do yardwork, care for their dogs, and run various
errands for them.” 172 The defendants argued that the TVPA “was
164F

165F

16F

167F

168F

169F

170F

17F

172F

164 United States v. Raniere, 384 F. Supp. 3d 282, 312–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Mack Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss First Superseding
Indictment at 14).
165 761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014).
166 See, e.g., Letter Brief for Appellant at 2, Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc., 986 F.3d 537
(5th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-50691), 2020 WL 1666977, at *2; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 9 n.5, GEO Grp., Inc. v. Menocal, 139 S. Ct. 143 (2018) (No. 17-1648), 2018 WL 2809390,
at *9 n.5.
167 Toviave, 761 F.3d at 623–24.
168 Id.
169 Reply Brief for Appellant at 8–9, Barrientos v. CoreCivic, 951 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir.
2020) (No. 18-15081), 2019 WL 2417131, at *8–9.
170 801 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 2015).
171 Id. at 614.
172 Id.
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passed to combat international trafficking in human beings and
that Congress did not intend to criminalize the type of conduct
charged in this case,” citing Toviave as support for excluding household chores from the meaning of “labor or services” in § 1589. 173 The
Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that “labor or services” must be interpreted according to its plain meaning:
173F

There was voluminous testimony that [the adult victim] was
constantly cleaning the apartment, running errands for Defendants, doing yardwork, and otherwise performing domestic
tasks from morning until night. These tasks certainly constitute labor or service under the ordinary meaning of those
words, and Defendants cite no authority for the proposition
that household chores do not constitute labor or service under
the statute. 174
174F

The court clarified that its holding in Toviave was premised
on the unique facts of that particular guardian-child relationship
and “did not hold that household chores do not constitute labor or
services.” 175 Because the special circumstances of Toviave were
not implicated in Callahan, the court affirmed the defendants’
convictions under § 1589. 176
Other circuits have similarly taken a plain-meaning approach. In United States v. Kaufman, 177 the Tenth Circuit rejected
the defendants’ arguments that § 1589 only applied to “work in
an economic sense.” 178 The defendants had regularly forced victims to engage in masturbatory and other sexual acts while the
defendants recorded these acts. They argued that this could not be
considered “labor or services” under § 1589 because the acts did not
produce an “economic benefit” and the tapes had “no general economic value,” and thus were not “work in its regular, economic
sense.” 179 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and held that
the district court did not err by using the following jury instructions: “‘Labor’ means the expenditure of physical or mental effort.
175F

176F

17F

178F

179F

173

Id. at 617–18.
Id. at 620.
175 Callahan, 801 F.3d at 620 (emphasis in original).
176 Id. at 621.
177 546 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008).
178 Id. at 1263 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Appellant’s Brief at 60, United
States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008)).
179 See Reply Brief of Appellant at 23, 40–41, United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d
1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (No. 04-CR-40141), 2008 WL 1964584, at *23, *40–41.
174
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‘Services’ means conduct or performance that assists or benefits
someone or something.” 180
The Second Circuit has also held that “labor or services”
should be interpreted using its plain meaning. In United States v.
Marcus, 181 the defendant argued that “the usual presence of compensation for the labor or services at issue should be a requirement
for a conviction under [§ 1589]” and that the statute “was only
meant to proscribe conduct that compels the victim to provide labor
or services ‘for a business purpose.’” 182 The defendant argued that
household chores in the context of an “intimate living arrangement” should be excluded from the statute’s reach. 183 The district
court, however, rejected the defendant’s suggested tests in favor of
adopting the ordinary meaning of the statutory language. 184 The
court considered that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the term ‘labor’ is
an ‘expenditure of physical or mental effort especially when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory’” and that “the term ‘services’ is defined
as ‘useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity.’” 185
The Second Circuit affirmed this interpretation. 186
Taken together, these cases illustrate that courts have consistently adopted the plain meaning of “labor or services” and rejected the idea that § 1589 applies only to so-called paradigmatic
forced labor cases. This is true even in situations where the activities giving rise to TVPA liability consist of housekeeping chores.
Moreover, these cases show a history of uncontroversial application of § 1589 to cases with no international component.
180F
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182F

183F

184F

185F

186F

V. INTERPRETING “LABOR OR SERVICES” IN THE IMMIGRATION
DETENTION CONTEXT
A.

The Line-Drawing Dilemma: Permissible Housekeeping or
Illegal Forced Labor?

As discussed previously, private detention corporations have
argued for a limited interpretation of “labor or services” that
180

Kaufman, 546 F.3d at 1260, 1263.
487 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other
grounds, 628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010).
182 Id. at 300–01 (quoting Defendant’s Reply Brief at 3, United States v. Marcus, 487
F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)).
183 Id. at 300.
184 See id. at 300, 304.
185 Id. at 300 (quoting Labor and Services, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED (2002)).
186 United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2010).
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would, at a minimum, exclude requiring detained people to complete housekeeping tasks under threat of punishment. This reading of the TVPA would permit § 1589 claims premised on forced
participation in the VWP or the unpaid shadow work program,
but it would bar suits premised solely on tasks defined as personal
housekeeping.
Thus far, courts have suggested some receptiveness to this
narrow interpretation of § 1589. In Owino, for example, the district court denied CoreCivic’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’
§ 1589 claims, but stated:
[CoreCivic] might argue that the “labor or services” it requires of detainees is miniscule—detainees are only required
to clean up their personal and communal areas. Logically,
this is a question of degree. If detainees are only forced to
make their beds then such conduct likely does not rise to
criminal forced labor. . . . Conversely, one could imagine
forced labor to such an extent and degree as to go well beyond
cleaning personal and communal areas. 187
187F

The Eleventh Circuit expressed a similar sentiment in Barrientos,
clarifying that its holding that private detention facilities are not
exempt from TVPA liability “should not be read . . . to call into
question longstanding requirements that detainees or inmates be
required to perform basic housekeeping tasks.” 188 And in Novoa,
the district court bypassed the issue of whether housekeeping
tasks could qualify as forced labor under § 1589. The court denied
in part GEO’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff “alleged he
was a barber, which appears to exceed the housekeeping responsibilities a detainee may be required to perform.” 189 However, the
court’s language did not foreclose the possibility that housekeeping tasks may not be covered by § 1589. 190
This suggests that, despite the ample precedent establishing
that housekeeping labor is, in fact, included within the plain
meaning of § 1589, courts may nonetheless be willing to set a different standard for people in immigration detention facilities
than for people in nondetention settings. In other words, courts
18F

189F

190F

187

Owino, 2018 WL 2193644, at *6.
Barrientos, 951 F.3d at 1277–78.
189 Novoa v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-02514, 2018 WL 3343494, at *14 (C.D. Cal.
June 21, 2018).
190 See id. (“Moreover, what duties and tasks the detainees were compelled to undertake and whether these assignments amounted to more than general housekeeping tasks
are factual issues.”).
188
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might accept that the detention context necessitates that some
line be drawn between the proper exercise of coercive power to
ensure the maintenance of order and the improper use of coercive
power to advance a scheme of forced labor. This may be due to the
assumption, as described by the Department of Justice’s amicus
brief in Barrientos, that there is “no basis for concluding that
Congress [in enacting the TVPA] intended to prevent detention
facilities from taking basic steps to ensure order and discipline.” 191
Because the scope of the mandatory cleaning assignments is
factually contested, courts have not yet squarely addressed where
the line is between permissible obligatory cleaning assignments
and TVPA-protected labor. Courts have not shed any light on
what metric, standard, or test might be used to draw this line.
Nor have the plaintiffs or defendants in these cases suggested a
workable limiting principle.
To the extent that courts and advocates have intimated an
answer to this dilemma, they have tended to rely, at least implicitly, on ICE’s PBNDS to draw these boundaries. 192 This is because
the PBNDS clearly state that detained people “shall not be required to work, except to do personal housekeeping” and narrowly
define personal housekeeping as: “1. making their bunk beds
daily; 2. stacking loose papers; 3. keeping the floor free of debris
and dividers free of clutter; and 4. refraining from hanging/draping
clothing, pictures, keepsakes, or other objects from beds, overhead
lighting fixtures or other furniture.” 193 These guidelines tend to
work in the plaintiffs’ favor because they enumerate only four
minor exceptions to the general rule that detained people are not
required to work. The PBNDS suggest a clear answer to the perceived need to limit the scope of § 1589 liability: tasks the PBNDS
define as required personal housekeeping cannot give rise to
§ 1589 liability, while tasks not defined as required personal
housekeeping can give rise to § 1589 liability. This rule would decidedly favor the plaintiffs in the currently pending cases given
19F

192F

193F

191 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 9,
Barrientos v. CoreCivic, 951 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-15081), 2019 WL 1468236,
at *9.
192 See, e.g., Owino, 2020 WL 1550218, at *21 (“The Court concludes that Plaintiffs
sufficiently have demonstrated for purposes of class certification that Defendant . . . may
have coerced detainees to clean areas of Defendant’s facilities beyond the personal housekeeping tasks enumerated in the ICE PBNDS.”); see also Gonzalez, 986 F.3d at 545 (Oldham,
J., dissenting) (“[T]o state a claim [under § 1589], [the plaintiff] first must allege that
CoreCivic violated the PBNDS.”).
193 PBNDS, supra note 11, at 405–06.
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the evidence that the unpaid obligatory tasks required under
GEO’s and CoreCivic’s sanitation policies extend beyond the
PBNDS definition of personal housekeeping to include cleaning
floors, windows, common spaces, bathrooms, and other areas. 194
Although this strategy provides a convenient answer to the
line-drawing problem, unquestioningly relying on the PBNDS as
a yardstick for TVPA liability is fundamentally flawed and possibly adverse to detained people’s long-term interests. This is because ICE could unilaterally change the PBNDS at any time. The
agency could alter the guidelines to include a more expansive definition of required personal housekeeping that mirrors CoreCivic’s and GEO’s current policies. ICE could, for example, include cleaning bathrooms and housing units to its list of personal
housekeeping tasks. Because the PBNDS permit punishment for
failing to complete personal housekeeping tasks—including solitary confinement—detained people would be back to square one
with conduct that was once defined as a violation of § 1589 now
arguably legitimized by its inclusion in the PBNDS.
This scenario illustrates why it is important to recognize that
the PBNDS could potentially conflict with § 1589 and thus are an
insufficient basis for determining which required tasks rise to the
level of “labor or services” protected by § 1589. How, then, should
courts draw a line between permissible chores in a detention setting and forced labor that gives rise to § 1589 liability? This question can be resolved by applying a simple standard to judge the
conduct at issue that looks to the nature and purpose of the required activity.
194F

B.

The McGarry v. Pallito Approach: Examining the Nature
and Purpose of the Labor

Following the Second Circuit’s approach in McGarry, courts
should examine whether (1) the task is truly personal, and
(2) whether the task serves the purpose of defraying institutional
costs. McGarry was about neither immigration detention nor the
TVPA. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit faced a legal question
that, in many ways, mirrors the question presented here. In
McGarry, the plaintiff was required to work in the prison laundry
while he was detained awaiting a criminal trial. Although the
plaintiff objected to the work, prison officials threatened him with

194

See, e.g., Owino, 2020 WL 1550218, at *21.
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solitary confinement and disciplinary proceedings that could affect his release eligibility if he refused. 195 The plaintiff argued that
this was a violation of his Thirteenth Amendment rights because
he had not yet been tried and convicted of a crime, and therefore
the criminal punishment exception to the Amendment did not
apply. 196
The Second Circuit considered, in the context of evaluating a
qualified immunity claim, whether the civic duty exception to the
Thirteenth Amendment permitted the government-run prison to
force the plaintiff to work in the laundry during the pretrial detention period. The court “assume[d] that correctional institutions may require inmates to perform personally related housekeeping chores such as, for example, cleaning the areas in or
around their cells, without violating the Thirteenth Amendment,”
and then questioned whether the plaintiff’s compelled laundry
service could “reasonably be construed as personally related
housekeeping chores.” 197 The court held that it could not. To make
this decision, the court noted the importance of both the nature and
purpose of the work at issue. The court stated that the Thirteenth
Amendment clearly bans “a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another.” 198 Although prison authorities may be able
to require a detained person to perform “personally-related
chores” that are not “for another,” this exception is limited. 199
Critically, the court emphasized that the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits authorities from requiring “inmates to perform chores
which . . . are not personally related, but are required to be performed solely in order to assist in the defraying of institutional
costs.” 200
Although the context of McGarry is different, the issue of
what labor can be excepted from the Thirteenth Amendment in
the pretrial detention context parallels the issue of what labor can
be excepted from § 1589 in the immigration detention context.
The two factors weighed in McGarry—whether the work is truly
personal and whether its purpose is to defray institutional costs—
make equal sense in the immigration detention context. In fact,
195F

196F

197F

198F

19F

20F
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McGarry, 687 F.3d at 509.
Id. at 509–10.
197 Id. at 514.
198 Id. at 513 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1,
16 (1906)).
199 See id. at 514.
200 McGarry, 687 F.3d at 514. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jobson v. Henne,
355 F.2d 129, 131–32 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966)).
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because the vast majority of immigration detention centers are
privately owned for profit, these considerations are perhaps even
more salient. These considerations can help provide courts with
clear and objective standards by which to separate permissible
required chores from illegal forced labor.
Turning to the immigration detention TVPA cases, the compelled housekeeping labor that detention corporations are attempting to exclude from the scope of “labor or services” fails
under the McGarry standard.
1. Whether the work is truly personal.
First, courts should consider whether the activities at issue
are truly personal or whether they are more aptly described as
“for another.” 201 The jobs assigned through the VWP as well as the
shadow work program can easily be defined as “for another.”
Someone who works as a barber or kitchen worker through the
VWP is not merely cutting her own hair or preparing her own
food. She is performing these tasks for the benefit of others.
Despite some instances where private detention centers have
attempted to classify these tasks as “self-care,” 202 the defendants
have generally refrained from arguing that these kinds of VWP
tasks are personal in nature. Rather, the defendants advance this
argument in full force with respect to the mandatory unpaid
cleaning assignments, which they repeatedly and vigorously assert
are “housekeeping tasks” that merely require detained people to
“clean up after themselves.” 203 But while some of the required
tasks may be construed as personal (such as cleaning a personal
sleeping area), the bulk of the tasks that detained people are
allegedly required to complete on a routine basis (scrubbing communal toilets, floors, showers, buffing floors, washing windows,
among others) are not tasks that are personal to individual detained persons. This is especially true in light of the fact that detention facilities are often shared by large numbers of people. In
the Stewart Detention Center, for example, one communal bathroom space is shared by approximately sixty men. 204
201F

20F

203F

204F

201

Id.
Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *3.
203 Mem. of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 7,
Owino v. CoreCivic, No. 17-CV-1112, 2018 WL 2193644 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2017), 2017
WL 8948699.
204 IMPRISONED JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 31.
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Some may argue that it is misguided to focus on the personal
nature of a task in the context of a communal living arrangement
like an immigration detention center. In communal living situations where many facilities are shared, one might argue, it is impractical and perhaps impossible to leave each individual to clean
up after themselves. Instead, it is far more practicable and efficient to split up the labor evenly among residents and have everyone pitch in. Although residents may technically be required to
perform a task for others rather than for themselves, they are not
required to do anything beyond their fair share of the labor.
This argument falls short for several reasons. First, it presupposes that immigration detention centers must be communal
living arrangements. But there is nothing inherent to the concept
of immigration detention that necessitates that people detained
pending immigration proceedings or removal be held in a communal living environment. People detained by ICE could be housed
in private or semiprivate environments rather than in communal,
prisonlike conditions. Indeed, the housing arrangements that ICE
currently provides vary in the degree to which accommodations
are shared. Some detained people, for example, share a cell and
bathroom with only one roommate, while others are kept in communal dormitories with up to sixty-six people in thirty-three
bunkbeds. 205
The communal nature of immigration detention is not a required feature of the system but rather a business model selected
by private detention corporations. This is unsurprising since
there are commonsense cost savings to communal living arrangements. But private detention corporations cannot argue that they
are justified in violating federal forced labor law because the law
is incompatible or inefficient as applied to their own freely chosen
business model. If corporations choose to house detained individuals in communal living arrangements, then they must ensure
that the living conditions are safe and sanitary without forcing
detained individuals to perform labor for others.
Second, even assuming that a communal living arrangement
is unavoidably necessary, the efficiency-based justification for requiring nonpersonal labor from detained individuals is incompatible with the fundamental tenets underlying forced labor laws.
205F
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Barrientos Complaint, supra note 136, at 18–19.

2021]

Defining Forced Labor

1243

Many defenders of pre–Civil War U.S. slavery, for example, argued that slavery was more efficient than a free labor system. 206
Economists continue to debate the economic efficiency of slavery
today. 207 But the Thirteenth Amendment and the TVPA soundly
reject forced labor in favor of a free labor market, regardless of
the comparative efficiency of these alternatives. In other words,
prohibitions on forced labor already consider and reject efficiency
arguments by their very nature. Courts have no role in questioning that constitutionally and statutorily codified value judgment.
Finally, it is irrelevant that detention centers theoretically
divide labor equally among detained individuals and only require
them to do their so-called fair share. The question of whether
forced labor is fairly divided among the coerced is of no consequence to its legality under § 1589.
In sum, assessing whether the activity in question is truly
personal versus for another is a helpful inquiry for determining
whether an activity qualifies as “labor or services” under § 1589
in the detention context.
206F

207F

2. Whether the purpose is to defray institutional costs.
Second, courts should consider whether the purpose and effect
of these allegedly coerced activities are to defray the institutional
costs of the detention center. Again, in terms of the coerced VWP
and shadow work program assignments, this factor is clearly present. If the detention corporations could not rely on detained labor
to staff the kitchens, paint the walls, or work medical detail for
little to no compensation, they would need to pay the state minimum wage to nondetained employees to complete these tasks.
There is also significant evidence that many of the unpaid
mandatory cleaning assignments serve to defray institutional
costs. This is reflected most clearly in the minimal number of
nondetained janitorial staff employed by private detention corporations. For example, plaintiffs alleged that GEO’s 2,000-bed
Adelanto detention facility in California at one point employed

206 See, e.g., LARRY E. TISE, PROSLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE OF SLAVERY IN
AMERICA, 1701–1840, at 100 (1987) (noting that “many economists in the antebellum period
[argued] that the plantation South . . . created the true basis of wealth for America” and
that slavery was “a national benefit”).
207 See generally, e.g., Peter A. Colcanis & Stanley L. Engerman, Would Slavery Have
Survived Without the Civil War?: Economic Factors in the American South During the
Antebellum and Postbellum Eras, 19 S. CULTURES 66 (2013) (debating the economics and
profitability of pre–Civil War slavery).
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only three nondetained janitors. 208 Moreover, these janitors were
employed solely to clean areas that detained people were not permitted to enter for security reasons. 209 GEO’s 525-bed Aurora detention facility reportedly employs only one nondetained janitor. 210 Because detained labor thus displaces paid, nondetained
janitorial labor, it substantially defrays institutional costs. Indeed, according to Stevens’s calculations, the use of detained labor saves GEO between $33 and $72 million and CoreCivic an estimated $30 to $77 million annually. 211
In contrast, the minor tasks outlined in the PBNDS definition
of personal housekeeping are examples of tasks that cannot be
reasonably characterized as serving the purpose of defraying institutional costs, such as “stacking loose papers” and “refraining
from hanging [items]” from light fixtures and furniture. 212 Instead, the primary purpose of these tasks seems more appropriately characterized as promoting safety and order in the facility.
In some instances, private detention corporations have argued that their use of detained labor has nothing to do with defraying institutional costs. GEO asserts that detained labor is
used to “keep detainees busy and reduce disciplinary infractions”
rather than defray costs. 213 But GEO has gone further than
simply claiming that defraying costs is not the primary purpose
of its labor policies. In fact, GEO claims that it would be more profitable—not less—if it did not use detained labor. Defending
against an unjust enrichment claim targeting the VWP, GEO
claimed that eliminating the dollar-per-day program and hiring
“employees of its own choosing (and skill levels)” would result in
“additional profit on that labor.” 214
However, these claims are inconsistent with the body of
scholarship examining the private detention industry. Significant
research by scholars and advocates supports the commonsense
proposition that obtaining labor at no cost or at one dollar per day
is vastly cheaper compared to compensating this labor according
208F
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See Novoa, 2019 WL 7195331, at *6.
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210 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 5, Menocal v. GEO Grp., 882 F.3d 905 (10th Cir.
2018) (No. 17-1125), 2017 WL 3382827, at *5.
211 Stevens, supra note 15, at 402; see supra Part III.
212 PBNDS, supra note 11, at 406; see supra Part V.A.
213 Motion for Summary Judgment at 7–8, Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 14-CV02887 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 2020).
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to state and federal minimum wage and labor regulations. 215 In
addition, these claims are at odds with GEO’s own statements.
For example, when discussing the Menocal case in a 2017 shareholder letter, GEO stated that “[i]f the Company had to change
the level of compensation under the voluntary work program, or
to substitute employee work for voluntary work, this could increase costs of operating these facilities.” 216
In sum, the McGarry standard provides a useful approach to
drawing the line between permissible personal housekeeping requirements and activities that constitute “labor or services” under
§ 1589. It is important to emphasize that just because an activity
is considered “labor or services” does not mean that it violates the
TVPA or that detained people cannot carry out that activity in a
detention center. Rather, it simply means that detained people
must voluntarily choose to participate in the activity. Section 1589 is only violated if private detention corporations force
or coerce people to perform the labor or service under threats of
physical, legal, or other serious harm.
215F

216F

CONCLUSION
How courts ultimately define what constitutes TVPAprotected “labor or services” has significant potential consequences for peopled confined inside immigration detention facilities. Of course, plaintiffs base some of their claims on labor that
is clearly beyond the scope of “housekeeping”—such as forced participation in the VWP and unpaid shadow work program—and
thus their claims will not be gutted if courts develop a permissive
housekeeping exception to the TVPA. But a definition that categorically exempts housekeeping labor without specifically applying narrowing factors such as those suggested in McGarry would
leave the door open for detention corporations to continue to
maintain their facilities through unpaid, involuntary labor and
for ICE to legitimize this practice through its guidelines. As a result, any real change in conditions would be minimal. Courts
should instead ensure that people detained in for-profit immigration detention centers receive the full federal protection from
forced labor to which they are entitled.
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